Exorcising private armies a daunting task

LAKBAYAN delegates from Mindanao, Southern Tagalog and the National Capital Region gather near Redemptorist Church in Baclaran, Parañaque City, in commemoration of the fifth anniversary of the Maguindanao massacre. NIÑO JESUS ORBETA

(Last of two parts)

GENERAL SANTOS CITY— Through the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro, which the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) signed with the government, the guerrillas have given up armed struggle in exchange for wider autonomy crafted under a proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law. The fate of the measure now rests in Congress’ hands.

The MILF has committed to decommission its armed wing— the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces—in a process that would be guided by a “normalization program.”

Under the proposed Bangsamoro entity, private armed groups (PAGs) are supposed to vanish like a bad dream when one wakes up.

But removing PAGs is easier said than done.

In 2010, the Philippine National Police told the Independent Commission Against Private Armies, also known as the Zenarosa Commission, that it had counted at least 117 PAGs nationwide. At least 25 of these were in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), which the Bangsamoro entity is seeking to replace. The ARMM has the most PAGs of the country’s 13 regions.

Exorcising the PAG demon is a daunting task, both the MILF and the government had agreed.

Autonomy

As an embodiment of meaningful political autonomy, the Bangsamoro government will enjoy greater fiscal powers, making it less dependent on doles from the central government to bankroll its development initiatives.

In the current setup, under which the Ampatuans had thrived, local politicians strive to deliver “command votes” for national politicians to make it easier to secure fiscal favors once they are elected into office.

Having a private army is a major factor that boosts a politician’s capacity to deliver votes. In the case of the Ampatuans, they used their strong grip over vote-rich Maguindanao province to extend political clout over the ARMM.

Through an alliance with a leading political family in Lanao del Sur province, the Ampatuans controlled the ARMM from 2005 until early 2010, when then Gov. Zaldy Ampatuan was suspended. Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur account for at least 60 percent of the 1.5 million voters in the region at the time.

The Ampatuan clan’s support for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in 2004 helped her clinch high vote figures in the official count. This advantage was also shown by the supposed senatortial victory of Miguel Zubiri in 2007, though this was later found to be fictitious, forcing him to give it up in favor of now Sen. Aquilino Pimentel III.

But with the Bangsamoro autonomy’s design, there may no longer be a need to kowtow to the powers-that-be in the central government, as the regional government will be assured of annual block grants. These are annual automatic appropriations, just like the internal revenue allotment for local governments.

The lopsided conglomeration of regional political power in favor of vote-rich provinces can also be cured with the proposed three-tier representation system in the future Bangsamoro parliament. The ARMM legislature is composed of three representatives each from the eight legislative districts throughout the region.

In the Bangsamoro, the parliament will be composed of at least 60 representatives. Of these, 50 percent will be elected through party proportional representation, 40 percent elected from single-representative parliamentary districts and 10 percent reserved for marginalized sectors, like indigenous peoples, migrant settlers and women.

With this, not only is political power diffused among geographic areas, the party representation system is also expected to develop a platform-focused, rather than personality-oriented, voting tendency.

Addressing ‘rido’

The fight between the Ampatuans and Mangudadatus over the Maguindanao gubernatorial seat, which began in 2009, constituted “rido,” or clan feud, said Moro academic Abhoud Syed Lingga of the Cotabato City-based Institute of Bangsamoro Studies.

Rido has persisted amid the modernizing social, political and economic context of Moro communities.

For one, the contest over an elective seat is not a regular feature in the traditional feudal setup. It is a fixture in the Western democracy introduced by the Americans in Moro communities.

A 2005 study on over 1,300 rido cases found that disputes over land and competition for political office are the leading causes of feuds among families and clans in Moro communities in Mindanao.

Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao, which are prospective parts of the territory of the future Bangsamoro government, account for the biggest number of cases, both in total incidents and in feuds generated by political rivalry.

But unlike the popular expectation when a rido occurs, the conflict does not necessarily result in a violent attack, according to Lingga. He, however, acknowledges that generally, only a few remaining social institutions in Moro society can be tapped to resolve such disputes before these turn bloody.

The disappearance of these traditional institutions is brought about by the inroads of modern political structures and systems.

The future Bangsamoro government seeks to develop these traditional systems of dispute settlement. When established, there will be a multimodal system of justice, with the institutionalization of Shariah to cover only Muslims, improvement of the network of civil courts, recognition of the customary laws of indigenous peoples and the adoption of alternative dispute resolution methods.

One key challenge in sprucing up a traditional dispute mechanism is in restoring or maintaining the social dynamics that underpin its effective functioning. For one, many traditional leaders no longer occupy political and economic positions in their communities, limiting their sway over potential disputing parties.

In the hinterlands of Iligan City, which is populated by the Maranao and Higaonon, many datus and sultans have to give up their wealth to bankroll conflict resolution processes among families to prevent these from escalating and engulfing the larger community.

“Why use personal wealth? Because these traditional leaders no longer have the so-called legitimate power to exact tributes or taxation from the people, [the proceeds of which] could have paid for the dispute resolution process,” noted Roberto Quijano of Pailig Development Foundation, which has been assisting Iligan communities in traditional dispute settlement.

In this respect, these leaders play significant roles in their communities.