PNP probers’ finding so far: ‘Gap between plan and actual operation’
Marwan. PHOTO FROM FBI.GOV
MANILA, Philippines—There was a gap between the plan and the actual execution of the Special Action Force (SAF) operation on Jan. 25 in Mamasapano, Maguindanao province, where 44 commandos were killed in a firefight.
This was one of the findings of the board of inquiry (BOI), created by the Philippine National Police to investigate the deaths of the police commandos who were on a mission to arrest two high-profile terrorists.
The SAF was out to arrest Zulkifli bin Hir, alias “Marwan,” a Malaysian bomb maker, and Abdul Basit Usman, his Filipino cohort. However, they were waylaid by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters.
In its initial report dated Feb. 9, the BOI noted that “there was a gap between the plan and the actual operation,” based on the statements of the witnesses.
Forty-one members of the 84th Special Action Company (SAC) served as the assault team which served the warrant in Barangay Pidsandawan, while the 55th SAC was the blocking force in Barangay Tukanalipao, Mamasapano.
Eight of the 41 policemen from the 84th SAC were killed, while only one of the 35 members of the 55th SAC survived the attack.
Not in target positions
The BOI pointed out that except for the 84th SAC or the seaborne unit, which served as the assault team or the “major support,” the other SAF units did not reach their designated positions.
“The movement of the seaborne took about two hours longer than planned. They were delayed by the difficult terrain and the strong river current near the target,” the BOI said in a statement.
The departure of the support groups, including the 55th SAC which suffered the most casualties, was delayed because the plan called for synchronization of movement with that of the 84th SAC.
“Notwithstanding the delays, the seaborne 84th SAC was still able to reach its objective and neutralize Marwan,” the BOI said.
Dubbed “Oplan Exodus,” the SAF plan to arrest Marwan and the coordination between the PNP and the Armed Forces of the Philippines during the operation were the subject of the BOI’s investigation.
As of Tuesday, the BOI and its operational audit team had gotten the sworn statements of 319 witnesses out of 420 potential resource persons on the incident.
The head of the inquiry, Director Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG), said the BOI and a team of 46 CIDG investigators had spent 5,152 hours since the day after the incident to get the affidavits of officers from the PNP and AFP.
12 SAF groups
The SAF deployed 392 commandos, assigned to 12 different operating groups, for the mission.
Magalong said one group was assigned as the main effort, four groups as support effort, two groups as blocking forces and two groups for route security.
An advance command post and a tactical command post were established as well for command and control.
The BOI was able to establish that the area of the operation was unfavorable—a marshland of criss-crossing rivers, wide open cornfields and irrigation canals, as well as the presence and strength of various armed groups. There were only five municipal police stations in the area.
In his report to the PNP officer in charge, Deputy Director General Leonardo Espina, Magalong said 302 of the 348 SAF personnel had given their statements while there were 42 others who have yet to submit their statements.
Fourteen from the AFP have also given their statements. Four personalities from the Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities have given their statements as well.
MILF affidavits
The BOI has yet to take the sworn affidavits of three personalities from the MILF and the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao police.
Magalong said the BOI would be truthful and transparent in its probe and that it was planning to visit the area of the operation in Mamasapano, Maguindanao, as soon as the security situation allowed it.
He emphasized the need for data from a site survey which will contribute in reconstructing the events and for analyzing the actions and decisions of the SAF commanders and team leaders.
“There will be no letup in the inquiry. With the support of the CIDG and Internal Affairs Service, we will continue taking depositions, identifying and locating other witnesses that can provide additional information on the incident,” Magalong said.
The BOI members are Director Catalino Rodriguez and Chief Supt. John Sosito, while a five-man operational team is composed of Senior Supt. Robert Po (team leader), Senior Superintendents Ronald de la Rosa, Cesar Hawthorne Binag and Benigno Duran, and Chief Insp. David Joy Duarte.
The BOI is aiming to submit its final report on the incident by Feb. 26.
