BOI: President broke PNP chain of command

President Benigno Aquino. AP FILE PHOTO/BULLIT MARQUEZ

From the very start, sacked Special Action Force (SAF) commander Getulio Napeñas expected he would lose around 10 of his commandos to “Oplan Exodus” that was hatched on Jan. 25 in Mamasapano, Maguindanao province. But in the end, he lost 44 of his men.

Oplan Exodus was a “high-risk” type of operation and “defective from the very beginning,’’ according to police investigators who also said that Napeñas and no less than President Benigno Aquino III violated the chain of command in the Philippine National Police in implementing the mission.

The PNP board of inquiry (BOI) report also found Mr. Aquino had authorized suspended PNP chief Alan Purisima, a personal friend, to take part in the SAF operation though he was suspended and being investigated for corruption.

The report said Mr. Aquino gave the go-signal for “Oplan Exodus,” the Jan. 25 SAF operation in Mamasapano, Maguindanao province, to take down terrorists Zulkifli bin Hir, alias “Marwan,” Basit Usman and Amin Baco.

Mr. Aquino, Purisima and Napeñas kept the mission to themselves and violated the chain of command by deliberately failing to inform the PNP officer in charge, Deputy Director General Leonardo Espina, about the operation, the report said.

Purisima gave the President inaccurate information on the ground, the fact-finding report also said.

The report said the United States was involved in the operation, but the US role was limited to intelligence and medical evacuations.

The results of the PNP board of inquiry investigation came out four days after President Aquino said he was given wrong information about the operation, blaming Napeñas for the botched mission.

The police report was based on sworn statements from about 300 witnesses, police and military officials. President Aquino and Purisima were not interviewed for the report. Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff Gen. Gregorio Pio Catapang Jr. and Lt. Gen. Rustico Guerrero, Westmincom commander, refused to be interviewed “despite repeated requests,” the board said.

Purisima, Catapang, Guerrero and other military officials also denied the board’s request to turn over their cell phones for forensic investigation, the report said.

Early on Jan. 25, SAF commandos sneaked into Moro rebel-controlled Mamasapano to capture Marwan, Usman and Baco. They killed Marwan, but Usman and Baco escaped.

As they withdrew from the town, the commandos were ambushed by guerrillas from the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

Forty-four commandos, 18 MILF guerrillas and five civilians were killed in the 12-hour gun battle.

The heaviest single-day combat loss for the SAF was way beyond Napeñas’ estimate of 10 casualties for Oplan Exodus.

The board found that the troop movement for the mission was mismanaged, the troops failed to occupy their positions, there was lack of effective communication among the operating troops, command control was ineffective and, foremost, there was no coordination with the military and the joint government-MILF ceasefire committee.

In a speech to leaders of evangelical groups on Monday, President Aquino blamed the defects of Oplan Exodus on Napeñas and said he was “fooled” by the people who knew most what was happening. He did not mention Purisima.

But the board of inquiry report said Mr. Aquino as Commander in Chief approved the mission and it was implemented by Purisima and Napeñas.

The report said Purisima violated his preventive suspension and Espina’s directive to suspended police officers to desist from discharging their duties and functions during the pendency of their cases.

Purisima, the report said, ignored the PNP chain of command by excluding Espina in the planning and execution of Oplan Exodus.

He and Napeñas also failed to inform Interior Secretary Mar Roxas, the PNP overseer, about the operation.

The report said Roxas was informed about the mission only in the morning of Jan. 25 when the mission was already being executed. He learned about it through a text message from Police Director Charles Calima Jr. at 7:43 a.m.

Purisima, the report said, called Espina at 5:30 a.m. to inform him about the mission.

But Purisima failed to deliver on his assurances about coordinating the mission with the military and at a crucial stage of the crisis provided inaccurate information from an unofficial source, further jeopardizing the situation of the 55th Special Action Company (SAC), the blocking force, and the 84th Seaborne, the assault force, in Mamasapano, the report said.

President knew

It said Purisima participated in Oplan Exodus with the knowledge of President Aquino. It cited a meeting among Purisima, Napeñas and the President for discussion of the mission and Purisima’s communicating with Mr. Aquino by text messages as the operation was going on.

Purisima’s lawyer, Kristoffer James Purisima, said the resigned PNP chief would respond to all allegations “at the proper time and before the proper forum.”

The board of inquiry said it indicated in the report possible violations of laws and regulations by some people involved in the mission, but stopped short of recommending them, stating that “appropriate government agencies should continue the investigation to make this determination.”

In its report, the board emphasized that the PNP chain of command was violated. It said that the chain of command that should have been observed with respect to the mission was Espina as senior commander to Napeñas, who was the intermediate commander.

Purisima could not legally form part of the chain of command “by reason of his suspension,” the report said.

Aquino approved mission

It said the records showed that President Aquino approved Oplan Exodus.

“The President gave the go-signal and allowed the execution of Oplan Exodus after the concept of operations was presented to him by Napeñas. (He) allowed the participation of the suspended CPNP Purisima in the planning and execution of the (mission) despite the suspension order of the Ombudsman,” it said.

“The President exercised his prerogative to deal directly with Napeñas instead of PNP officer in charge Leonardo Espina… and while (he) has the prerogative to deal directly with any of his subordinates, the act of dealing with Napeñas instead of PNP OIC Espina bypassed the established PNP chain of command,” the report said.

As for Napeñas, the report said the SAF commander followed Purisima’s instructions not to inform Espina and Roxas despite knowing that Purisima was suspended, thus violating the chain of command.

“Napeñas failed to effectively supervise, control and direct personnel, which resulted in heavy casualties of the SAF commandos,” the report said.

‘Time on target’

Napeñas also followed his “time on target” (TOT) coordination concept despite President Aquino’s directive for coordination with the military prior to the operation.

“The TOT coordination concept adopted by the SAF does not conform with the established and acceptable operational concepts and protocols of the PNP,” the report said.

The board found that it was Napeñas who proposed to President Aquino to adopt the TOT coordination for the mission and “it appears” his consideration for this was operational security “to reduce the risk of having Oplan Exodus compromised.”

When Mr. Aquino instructed Purisima and Napeñas to coordinate with the military, Napeñas raised concern that the mission “might be compromised due to intermarriages of some AFP personnel with the local people.”

“When Napeñas proposed to the President the adoption of the TOT concept for Oplan Exodus, the President remained silent,” the report said.

It said Napeñas admitted he had command responsibility for the mission and he “dominated the mission planning, disregarding inputs from his subordinate commanders on how the operation would be conducted.”

High-risk operation

The report said Napeñas’ concept of the “way-in/way-out, by foot and night-only infiltration and exfiltration in an enemy-controlled community with unrealistic assumptions was a high-risk type of operation.”

“Oplan Exodus can never be executed effectively because it was defective from the very beginning,” it said.

The board concluded that the planning of Oplan Exodus was defective due to poor analysis of the area of operation; unrealistic assumptions; poor intelligence estimate; absence of abort criteria; lack of flexibility in its concept of operation; inaccurate application of TOT, and absence of prior coordination with the military and the joint government-MILF ceasefire committee.

In its site survey in Mamasapano on Feb. 24, the board noted the “unfavorable terrain faced by reinforcing troops.”

“The wide terrain between their location and that of the 55th SAC was literally flat without adequate cover and concealment. Tactical maneuvers… would have been difficult and may result in more casualties. According to the platoon leaders, enemy [fire was] coming from all directions, which prevented them from maneuvering and reinforcing the 55th SAC,” it said.

The board said the SAF’s tactical command post (TCP) and advance command post (ACP) were “plagued by failures of command and control from the very start, especially in the aspect of communication.”

Mobile communication devices were used as primary mode of communication in the operations and these devices “fell short of what were needed to relay real-time information and coordination of activities to and from the chain of command,” it said.

“Radio operators were assigned at the TCP, one each for the 84th Seaborne and 55th SAC… (but these forces) lost contact during the crucial moments of executing Oplan Exodus. They had to rely on distinctive gunfire to approximate each other’s location. Radio net diagram was provided but failed when radio equipment bogged down,” it said.

Overwhelming enemy strength

The SAF troops also found that some of the 40 mm grenades for their M203 grenade launchers were defective, the report said.

The troops had sufficient ammunition, but eventually ran out of ammo due to the “overwhelming strength of the enemy,” it said.

Also, their Motorola handheld radios failed when they were submerged in water and the battery life of these radios was short due to wear and tear, it said.

“There was a breakdown of command and control at all levels due to ineffective and unreliable communication among and between the operating units,” it said.

Looking at the military response to the SAF, the board said artillery fire support was “not delivered when needed.”

It said the military did not deliver the support in consideration of the peace process.

The military also demanded prior coordination so that it could take action immediately but it sent mechanized units and infantry to reinforce the SAF, the report said.

“White phosphorous artillery rounds were fired late in the afternoon. However, by then, all of the 55th SAC lay dead except for one who was able to escape,” it said.
 

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