SC: Criticism of public official’s performance not oral defamation
Statements uttered against public officers cannot be considered slanderous when these are related to the performance of their official duties—and unless they are done maliciously.
Thus ruled the Supreme Court as it acquitted Argelyn Labargan of grave oral defamation against Aileen Macabangon, a barangay councilor of Muntay, Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte.
The high tribunal’s Second Division granted Labargan’s petition for review on certiorari, overturning the 2018 Court of Appeals (CA) decision that had upheld her conviction and sentenced her to six months of imprisonment.
The case, recorded as G.R. No. 246824, dates back to February 2013, when Macabangon was mediating a dispute between Labargan and a neighbor.
While passing by Labargan’s house, she allegedly heard Labargan shout from her terrace that she was dull-minded, uneducated, ignorant, and biased toward her opponent.
Article continues after this advertisementAccording to court records, the statements were heard by other people nearby, since Labargan’s house was located along a highway.
Article continues after this advertisementIn a 2016 ruling, the Municipal Trial Court in Lanao del Norte found Labargan guilty of grave oral defamation, a decision later upheld by the Regional Trial Court and the appellate court.
In its Dec. 6, 2023, decision, which was made public only on Wednesday, the Supreme Court acquitted Labargan as it cited the prosecution’s failure to show actual malice in her statements against Macabangon.
Crime, fault or flaw
Under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, oral defamation or slander occurs when an allegation of a crime, fault, or flaw is made orally, publicly, and maliciously against a living or deceased person, and that allegation tends to cause dishonor to the person defamed.
The law presumes that a defamatory statement is made with malice, meaning the burden of proof lies with the person making the defamatory remarks to show that there was no malice involved.
“The imputations were criticisms of her competence as a barangay kagawad, originating from her supposed partiality against petitioner in the barangay conciliation proceedings. Clearly, these relate to Macabangon’s discharge of her official duties as a public officer,” the Supreme Court said in the decision penned by Senior Associate Justice Marvic Leonen.
While the petitioner’s remarks may be considered offensive, the high tribunal noted that they were “not actionable by themselves.”
Not for ‘sensitive’ type
“Being ‘sensitive’ has no place in this line of service, more so when allowing otherwise has the potential to create a chilling effect on the public,” it noted.
The Supreme Court further reminded elected officials that public office is a public trust, saying that “persons clothed with authority … must be prepared for public scrutiny and, potentially, criticisms inherent in the position.”
Citing the 1994 decision in Yabut v. Office of the Ombudsman, the high tribunal reiterated: “A public official, more especially an elected one, should not be onion-skinned.”
“Strict personal discipline is expected of an occupant of a public office because a public official is a property of the public. He is looked upon to set the example of how public officials should correctly conduct themselves, even in the face of extreme provocation,” it said.