SC hearing gives Poe hope
Presidential candidate and Senator Grace Poe INQUIRER PHOTO / RICHARD A. REYES
IF THE COURT upholds the “impossible” requirement for a foundling to prove his unknown parentage, generations of Filipino foundlings will suffer the unintended consequences.
Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno had this to say in her 20-minute interpellation of Alexander Poblador, counsel of presidential candidate Grace Poe, a foundling now facing challenges to the status of her citizenship and qualification for public office as the senator fights to remain in the running for the nation’s top post.
Sereno Tuesday underscored the magnitude of any decision the high court would make on Poe’s challenge to her disqualification, saying generations of foundlings would be affected by how the court would rule on the case.
Sereno zeroed in on who should carry the burden of proof that Poe is not a natural-born Filipino and hence not qualified to seek public office—the reason the Commission on Elections (Comelec) had voted to disqualify her from the May presidential election.
For Sereno, compelling a foundling to prove his or her unknown parentage was an “impossible condition,” and that upholding such a requirement would betray the presumption in Philippine adoption laws that a foundling is a Filipino.
“We have to be careful that we’re not held by a rigid reading of what we consider as a failure to enumerate foundlings. We are going to create unintended consequences, the difficulties of which are not only going to be visited on your client but on so many foundlings in this country,” said Sereno, the last justice to ask Poblador questions in three-hour oral arguments Tuesday.
Profound implication
“The implication is very profound, not only for your client. I would put a blinder on who your client is and just focus on the implication on foundling rights, who are being required by the position of petitioners to prove an impossible condition,” Sereno said.
She sought to establish how the country’s laws on domestic and international adoption carried the presumption that foundlings in the Philippines were in fact Filipinos, hence Philippine courts had jurisdiction over them.
By mere title, she noted that Republic Act No. 8552 is called “An act establishing rules and policies on the domestic adoption of Filipino Children, and for other purposes.”
“Meaning foundlings are covered by rules on the adoption of Filipino children,” Sereno said.
Republic Act No. 8043 is titled “An act establishing the rules to govern intercountry adoption of Filipino children and for other purposes,” and also spells out rules on the intercountry adoption of foundlings in the Philippines.
“The legislature itself accords foundlings the presumption of citizenship,” Poblador said.
Under the country’s adoption laws and the civil code, Poblador said, “no court can assume jurisdiction of the foundling if foundling is not presumed Filipino.”
Sereno said that while the law may at times be “silent, obscure or ambiguous,” courts were tasked to issue rulings based on legislative interpretation so that justice would be upheld.
“The law intends for justice and right to prevail. So the point of us making sure that justice prevails is not a vox populi requirement. I disagree with that. It is a duty which justices are required to observe because it is even statutorily required of us in keeping with our mandate under the civil code and inherent functions we are exercising as a court,” Sereno said.
“I’m very interested because there are parents now who want to adopt. What this court is going to say will speak to them… Whether we find it strictly by saying that the language is silent—so the right of foundlings is completely silent—or will resort to interpretation, not only statutory construction, but judicial interpretation, and administrative practices in order that a just and right ruling will result,” Sereno said.
After three hours, the court adjourned until the next hearing, set on Tuesday.
Enough evidence
Associate Justice Marvic Leonen, picking off where he left during the first hearing on Tuesday last week questioning Poblador, reiterated that those seeking the senator’s disqualification never presented any evidence that she was a foreigner, and thus she was presumed a natural-born Filipino eligible to seek the presidency.
Leonen questioned whether evidence was presented in the Comelec enough to prove that Poe was a natural-born Filipino citizen, considering that the proceedings at the poll body were summary in nature, meaning there were no hearings.
Poblador admitted that Poe’s foundling certificate and decree of adoption were not enough to prove that one of the senator’s parents were Filipinos.
The lawyer, however, reiterated Poe’s position that she is natural-born based on presumptions under both domestic and international laws, to which Leonen replied, “Maybe to some of us it is too iffy, too ambiguous, too tenuous a link.”
The justice also asked Poblador to discuss in the memorandum to be submitted to the court on whether a foundling can be given a natural-born Filipino citizenship just because the foundling was found on Philippine territory.
On the residency issue, Poblador said the senator lived in the Philippines since birth, except for some 14 years when she was in the United States.
He also agreed with Leonen that the constitutional provision requiring a 10-year residency “immediately preceding the election” for presidential candidates did not say that the 10 years must be continuous.
Question of loyalty
The justice said that if the purpose of the 10-year residency rule was for the candidate to be familiar with the conditions in the country, then there may not be a reason for Poe not to be so since she lived most of her life in the Philippines and that because of technology such as the Internet, she could have been familiar with what is happening in the country.
Leonen also challenged the premise that the reason for imposing a natural-born citizenship requirement on candidates for President was to assure their loyalty to the country, asking if there ever was a scientific finding proving that non-natural-borns are not or less loyal.
He pointed out that a child born in Hawaii of parents who are Philippine citizens could theoretically run for president of the United States, although it would be up to American voters to decide to vote for the child when he runs for the office in the future.
Justices Antonio Carpio and Teresita Leonardo-De Castro focused on Poblador’s citation of international law in declaring that foundlings like Poe had the right to be citizens of the country where they are found.
Carpio pointed out that the 1930 Hague Convention cited by Poblador could not have been construed as international law applicable in the Philippines at the time the 1935 Constitution was enacted, saying that the convention only took effect in 1937 when the required 10 states ratified it.
Incremental acts
Carpio asked if Poblador could submit the income tax returns submitted by Poe in 2005 and 2006 while De Castro asked the lawyer to submit to the court the basis used by the Bureau of Immigration in declaring Poe as a natural-born citizen.
Justice Presbitero Velasco asked Poblador on the lawyer’s assertion that Poe’s decision to reestablish her residency in the Philippines was a “series of incremental acts.”
“Relocation is difficult. There are steps which must taken in totality,” adding that the elements of reacquisition of domicile—physical presence, intent to stay and no intention to return to previous residence were all present in Poe’s case.
Justice Mariano del Castillo, on the other hand, asked Poblador about his position that it should be up to the people to decide Poe’s qualifications in the election.
“You say vox populi vox dei [but] isn’t the Constitution also the voice of the people?” he asked, to which Poblador said the Constitution provided elections in which the people could continue to make their decisions.
