View from the Palace: Reply to BOI report

(Editor’s Note: Below is Malacañang’s point-by-point rebuttal of the charges hurled against President Benigno Aquino III in the board of inquiry [BOI] report on the Mamasapano controversy. The Palace response was prepared before the Senate report on the Mamasapano was released, so it answered only the BOI report.)

The President puts all the blame on others, but does not/cannot hold himself accountable.

How many times has the President said that the buck stops with him? How many times has he stated that the successes and failures are his because he is the Chief Executive? Did he not come out and say that he will carry this tragedy to the end of his days?

In the case of Mamasapano, the President said that Gen. [Getulio] Napeñas briefed him, and that during the briefing, General Napeñas was able to respond to every question of the President. It was a very detailed presentation: General Napeñas even spoke about moon calculations, and accounted for every possible enemy combatant in the area and plotted their locations, even going so far as to account for the friendlies in the area.

Who would have thought that General Napeñas would 1) disregard the President’s orders, and 2) provide false information (particularly that the SAF [Special Action Force] troops were being extracted when they weren’t)? Who would have thought that a subordinate would deceive the President? How could the President know that the assurances of General Napeñas were but mere drawings?

In hindsight, we can say that the President will most likely become more prudent in dealing with subordinates. The President has also said that structural reforms will be undertaken to prevent the occurrence of a mishap.

The President has reiterated in the past: The current solution comes from the correct identification of the problem. General Napeñas’ identification of the problem and dynamics on the ground in Mamasapano was severely flawed, and that led to the execution of wrong strategies.

The President, naturally being very cautious and leaving nothing to chance, as many of those who have worked for and with him can attest, insisted on the need for coordination for assets, forces and artillery; he recognized that “pintakasi” was a reality in Muslim Mindanao, a risk that our forces face.

On fanning anti-Moro sentiments, attacking the President, and calling for a halt to the BBL [Bangsamoro Basic Law] passage:

We are being criticized for pursuing peace. The call has been justice for all—that there is injustice now. But perhaps the greatest injustice is when we have a chance at peace, and there are certain sectors that find the solution only in an all-out war approach.

Racist stereotypes do not bear out, in terms of affording the framework agreement, the comprehensive agreement and the participation in the legislative process; the automatic call for peace comes from all the communities who have been driven out of Mindanao because of the fighting, who know firsthand the cost of war.

Is it right to say that we will secure the peace by eliminating everyone who is not like us, or is not with us? There is a concerted effort to clear all the racist stereotypes.

The question, to those seeking an all-out war: Mauubos ba natin silang lahat? O may matitira diyan na pakaunti-kaunti at magiging desperado—na talagang hindi naniniwalang pwede tayong mag-dialogue nang matino. Na mata sa mata na lang. Kung may magpunta sa mall dito sa Luzon at magpasabog ng bomba, saka ba natin sasabihing sayang ang pagkakataon noon sa kapayapaan?

About the MILF: We have a former secessionist group, which is willing to dialogue, work with us, and partner with us. Tapos ang tugon natin: Awayin sila? Para saan—para lang sa away? Palakasin natin ang kapayapaan, imbis na pahinain ito, kundi ay mangingibabaw ang mga radikal na ayaw sa kapayapaan.

On the BOI report

The BOI report has innuendos and hasty conclusions. An objective assessment of the report reveals enough factual errors and editorializing to erode its credibility.

Page 1, on the BOI’s failure to secure an interview with the President:

There was no formal request for interview sent to the President’s office. As the Palace statement points out: CIDG Director [Benjamin] Magalong had the opportunity to clarify matters with the President in an earlier meeting. As CIDG head, Magalong should have been aware of the need for due process to be observed in crafting the report.

One begins to wonder: How can the BOI report be on the involvement of the President when they did not even interview the President?

Page 3, on the President’s silence after being briefed on the time-on-target report:

This is incorrect and illogical. The time-on-target was not even brought up during their meeting. Director [Fernando] Mendez can confirm this, as he was in the meeting as well.

It is also difficult to imagine the President agreeing to such an idea; if he had insisted on coordination from the onset, why would he agree to a setup that would further delay coordination? That conclusion by the BOI sounds really illogical.

Page 9, on the claim that the President broke the chain of command:

This is an illogical conclusion. As Chief Executive, the President has the prerogative to deal with subordinates in the manner he deems appropriate.

The concept of chain of command makes perfect sense when it flows upwards, meaning subordinates reporting to their superiors. This ensures order and discipline.

However, there are situations when superiors coursing their orders downward though the chain of command would be counterintuitive, and the President, as Chief Executive, is entitled to take the most efficient route to solving problems, especially threats to security.

For example, if a fire broke out in a particular area, should the President course his orders through the chain of command, or speak directly to the unit that can respond in the quickest possible time, knowing that lives are on the line?

Page 10, on the absence of an abort criteria:

There were several instances when the SAF director had enough reason to abort the mission, yet decided against it.

“First, only 13 of the 38 members of the 84th Seaborne—the main element were able to cross the river toward the location of [Zulkifli bin Hir, alias] Marwan and [Basit] Usman. This was an inadequate force if the mission was to terminate both targets.

“The 55th SAC (Special Action Company), the supporting element, was supposed to have been at waypoint 20 as the main element was withdrawing. They reached only waypoint 12. They were unable to perform effectively as a reinforcing element.

“According to the plan, the SAF troopers should have jumped off at 2:30 in the morning. Yet reports show that by 5:30 a.m., most of the troops were yet to jump off.

This meant that they had lost the cover of darkness, and that devout Muslims who pray early in the morning would have been awake.

Page 8, on the cited “an unusually long gap or silence of SMS exchange between PDG [Alan] Purisima and the President after 11:38 a.m. and before 6:20 p.m.”

This is a perfect example of the report straying from the objective presentation of facts. First of all, if they believe that this was a significant occurrence, they could have taken the effort to ask the individuals involved, namely the President and former PNP chief Purisima.

But since we all know they never asked formally, we can conclude that they are essentially implying answers from the President, which is ridiculous. Anyone who is accused of a misdeed should be given an opportunity to defend himself. The BOI failed to do that. How can anyone find this baseless speculation credible?

Page 15, on the BOI’s claim that Purisima called Napeñas regarding the operation in November 2014, therefore violating his suspension:

This is not factual. Purisima was suspended on Dec. 4, 2014.

Page 23, 55th SAC being 1.8 km from the Seaborne:

The supporting element, the 55th SAC, was delayed in reaching its designated position. This caused a chain effect on the rest of the forces.

Page 41, on the claim of surviving SAF troopers that some of their equipment were stolen or missing:

The authorities will investigate this matter further.

This is a question for the Department of National Defense.

Page 44, on the claim that the President did not utilize the established chain of command:

Again, as established earlier, as Chief Executive, the President has the prerogative to deal with his subordinates in the manner he deems appropriate.

Page 52, on the claim that [Interior Secretary Mar] Roxas and [acting Philippine National Police chief Leonardo] Espina were kept in dark.

The President gave Purisima specific orders to inform Espina of the operation.

Pages 52-53, on the report on the President’s silence after Napeñas responded to his order to coordinate with the AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) by noting that the AFP was compromised:

The President did not remain silent. He insisted on coordination with the appropriate individuals on the ground.

Page 56, on the portion about the necessity of coordination with the AHJAG (Ad Hoc Joint Action Group) and the CCCH (Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities):

This would have been solved if there had been coordination with the AFP. The AFP, after all, is already conversant with the bodies that need to be informed, and would have ticked all the necessary boxes.

Page 57, on the 10-hour delay in giving fire support being deemed “unusual and unacceptable”:

This is a conclusion not borne of the facts. The narrative emphasizes the consequences of not having coordinated properly.

Page 58, on the claim that the plan itself did not call for coordination:

This is absolutely untrue. There was a matrix for coordination in the plan that was presented to the President.

Page 62, on the new Conops (concept of operations) for the interdiction of the HVTs (high-value targets) calling for approaching the target by foot at night, with just one way in and one way out:

The President was assured that there would be at least two exit paths.

Page 62, on the President’s silence when the concept of time-on-target was presented:

Refer to earlier response.

Page 62, on Napeñas “taking note” of the President’s “comments”:

It must be emphasized that the President did not give comments but orders—which were disobeyed by Napeñas.

On the conclusion

Napeñas’ text messages regarding the ongoing extraction, which is vital to an objective appreciation of what transpired, are missing.

On why the President coursed things through Purisima:

As the President has said, before General Purisima’s suspension by the Office of the Ombudsman in December 2014, he was involved in the previous operations to arrest Marwan and Usman. Thus, he had a good working knowledge of the challenges and obstacles in the said operation.

The President was fully aware of Purisima’s suspension, and it is evident that he did not rely on Purisima to oversee the actual operation.

For “Oplan Exodus,” the President called Purisima as a subject matter expert, while the person in command of the operation was the director of SAF.

The President also told Purisima to inform General Espina of the operation, since the latter is the officer in charge of the PNP.

The BOI report itself states that the President gave instructions to Napeñas to coordinate with the Armed Forces for the necessary support needed for the operation. Obviously, this order was disobeyed by Napeñas.

Also note that for previous operations, the President was not briefed by Purisima alone; the director of SAF was also present.

RELATED STORIES

Full report: The Mamasapano incident

Full text: Executive summary of Senate draft report on Mamasapano incident

BOI report highlights Aquino’s conflicting claims on Mamasapano debacle

View comments

TAGS: Malacañang, Mamasapano, Pintakasi