Fighting a common enemy
About 50 policemen, many of them members of the Special Action Force (SAF), a police commando unit, were killed in a clash with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) guerrillas in Maguindanao province on Sunday (64 bodies have so far been retrieved at press time—Ed).
Why an elite police troop—the equivalent of the Army’s Scout Rangers or Special Forces—suffered such a high death toll is beyond comprehension.
SAF policemen are supposed to be trained combatants unlike ordinary cops. They’re trained in jungle and guerrilla warfare and hostage rescue.
It would have been understandable if the casualties numbered two, three or even five, but 50 is way beyond the comprehension of people knowledgeable in guerrilla warfare.
Aren’t SAF members, like their Ranger and Special Forces counterparts, supposed to go on patrol in a group of six or up to nine members?
Elite units like the Rangers, Seals and Special Forces don’t go out in big groups because they’re supposed to move fast. Their speed allows them to move undetected.
The swiftness of SAF or military special units matches the rapid mobility of guerrillas who also operate in small groups.
But the SAF, Rangers, Special Forces and the local Seals are better trained and better equipped—some even trained in the United States—and therefore much better fighters than the Moro or communist guerrillas.
But why were the police elite troops trounced by MILF fighters?
Here’s the explanation of a veteran who is a guerrilla warfare expert:
They probably entered an area whose topography they were not familiar with. Troops who have mastery of the terrain almost always win.
Since they were going into a camp of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) to arrest two terrorists, a much bigger force should have been behind them.
They should have had air cover composed of attack helicopters or fighter jets.
While the SAF troops were fighting BIFF guerrillas, MILF fighters joined the fray and fought alongside their fellow Moros.
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Although there is supposedly bad blood between the MILF and the BIFF, the MILF fighters sided with BIFF guerrillas because they are Moros.
I remember what my father, Ramon Sr., who was assigned to Moro areas as an officer of the defunct Philippine Constabulary (PC), always said: A Moro will come to the aid of another Moro when the enemy is the government.
My old man said he and his fellow PC soldiers who were embedded in no-man’s land would arm one Moro outlaw to fight another Moro bandit group.
They called the Moro outlaws they armed the “friendly outlaws,” and referred to the enemy of this group as “enemy outlaws.”
The PC soldiers in Moro areas, true to their slogan of being “always outnumbered but never outfought,” would wait for the outlaw groups to decimate each other.
After the Moro groups battled it out, the PC soldiers would then deal with the survivors.
Why didn’t my father fight one group and, after eliminating its members, fight the other group later?
Because if they took on just one Moro group at a time, the other Moro outlaws would come to the aid of the other even if they were enemies, my father said.
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An important dictum in warfare: Know your enemy and your own self.
The SAF troops should have known the strength of the Moro fighters compared to theirs.
